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CASE LAW
A. Court of Justice
Juggling centralized constitutional review and EU primacy in the
domestic enforcement of the Charter:A.v. B.
Case C-112/13, A v. B and Others, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of
11 September 2014, EU:C:2014:2195
1. Introduction
Let the letters in the title of the judgment not fool anyone as to the anonymity
of the parties involved: the facts that can be gleaned from this and the relevant
Austrian judgments (the Kazakhstani plaintiff was alleged to have kidnapped
other Kazakhs and lived at various junctures in Austria and Malta) should
provide enough information for anyone with rudimentary skills in operating
search engines to unearth the sensational beginning and unexpected ending of
the protagonist. Such details, unfortunately, belong in a blockbuster movie
rather than an academic case note.
That said, a case note ought to be no less riveting to a student of EU law,
especially one which discusses a judgment that provides a further instalment
in the development of one of the mainstays of the Union judicial order: the
duties of national courts to ensure the primacy and effet utile of EU law,
including by means of Article 267 TFEU when this is indicated. Specifically,
this decision adds to the recent string of cases about the compatibility with EU
law of domestic procedural rules on the relationship between ordinary courts
and constitutional courts. These earlier decisions dealt with the continued
application of national legislation declared to be unconstitutional and also
questioned for its conformity with Union law;1 and the concurrence of
domestic and European preliminary reference procedures.2 A v. B and Others
1. Case C-409/06, Winner Wetten GmbH v. Bürgermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim,
EU:C:2010:503; Case C-314/08, Krzystof Filipiak v. Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej w Poznaniu,
EU:C:2009:719.
2. Joined Cases C-188 & 189/10, Aziz Melki and Sélim Abdeli, EU:C:2010:363.
Common Market Law Review 52: 1–30, 2015.
© 2015 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the United Kingdom.
Published in Common Market Law Review, 2015,  52 (5), 1309-1337.
revisits the latter issue against an unusual domestic backdrop, with the
national constitutional court accepting that the Charter of Fundamental Rights
enjoys, under certain conditions, constitutional status. It follows from the
ECJ’s judgment that the openness thus displayed towards the Union’s bill of
rights cannot have the effect of circumscribing the procedural powers that all
domestic courts possess as a matter of EU law, foremost among these the
ability to make use of Article 267 TFEU. In this case note, it is suggested that
national constitutional courts may accordingly wish to think carefully about
their approach vis-à-vis the substantive rights guaranteed in the Charter, and
what their choices in this regard may mean for their position within the
domestic judicial order in situations coming within the scope of Union law.
In addition, the Court was presented with the opportunity to elaborate on
the protection to be accorded to the rights of defence during in absentia
proceedings under Article 47 of the Charter.
2. Facts and procedure
B and others are Kazakh nationals and live in Kazakhstan. They believe that
A, a fellow Kazakhstani, is responsible for the abduction of their family
members in Kazakhstan and wish to bring a claim for damages against him.
Assuming that A is habitually resident in Austria, they accordingly initiated
proceedings in the Landesgericht Wien (regional court, Vienna) in late 2009.
When the Landesgericht was repeatedly unable to serve a notice on A to
inform him of the claim lodged against him, it decided to appoint a
representative in absentia to act on A’s behalf, as provided for under Article
116 of theAustrian Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO, the Code of Civil Procedure).
This representative argued that the tort action should be dismissed on its
merits without, however, contesting the Landesgericht’s competence to hear
the case. Before the Landesgericht could deliver its decision, A, having
learned of the ongoing proceedings, instructed a law firm to represent him in
this matter. A’s new representative challenged the jurisdiction of the
Landesgericht on the basis that A had permanently left Austria for Malta by
the time the proceedings were initiated by B and Others, and that it would be
wrong to treat the mere fact that the court-appointed representative had
entered a defence on A’s behalf as sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
Austrian courts nevertheless. The Landesgericht agreed and declared itself
incompetent to adjudicate the tort claim.
The finding of the Landesgericht was reversed on appeal by the
Oberlandesgericht Wien (higher regional court, Vienna), which held that
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the relevant Union instrument, Regulation 44/2001,3 only required the
Landesgericht to examine its international jurisdiction when the defendant
failed to enter an appearance. This, however, was found not to be the case here
asAustrian law equates the acts of a representative in absentia to those carried
out by the defendant himself.The failure of the court-appointed representative
in absentia to object to the Austrian courts adjudicating the tort claim
therefore meant that A could be treated as having tacitly accepted the former’s
jurisdiction.A thereupon brought a further appeal on a point of law before the
Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court in civil and criminal law matters),
asserting a violation of his rights of defence as guaranteed byArticle 6 ECHR
and Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The Oberster Gerichtshof was of the opinion that the broad powers
conferred on a representative in absentia under Austrian law enabled B and
others to enforce their right to an effective remedy, but at the same time noted
that this could indeed come at the expense of A’s right to be heard. It stayed the
proceedings and submitted three questions to the ECJ. Questions two and
three concerned the interpretation ofArticle 24 of Regulation 44/2001, which
confers international jurisdiction on a court that would not otherwise be
competent to hear the case if the defendant “enters an appearance”. The refer-
ring court queriedwhether national legislationwas justified, in light of Article
47 of the Charter, to include appearances by a court-appointed representative
in absentiawhen determining whether a defendant has in fact done so.
The first question concerned the type of remedial action national courts
should take when confronted with a legislative provision that they consider to
be contrary to the Charter: does the principle of equivalence require them to
request the country’s constitutional court to remove this rule from the statute
books, rather than them simply disapplying it in the case at hand, given that the
remedy of annulment with erga omnes effect is available when statutes are
considered to impinge on constitutionally protected rights?To fully appreciate
why theOberster Gerichtshof referred this question to the ECJ, it is necessary
to expound briefly on Austrian constitutional doctrine and case law.
3. Legal background
In Austria, the Verfassungsgerichtshof (constitutional court) is the supreme
guardian of that country’s Constitution.4 To this end, it has the exclusive
3. Council Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters, O.J. 2001, L 12/1.
4. For an accessible introduction in English see e.g. Stelzer, The Constitution of the
Republic of Austria, (Hart, 2011), pp. 197–204; Gamper and Palermo, “The Constitutional
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competence to rescind laws on grounds of unconstitutionality;5 when the
ordinary courts – divided into a civil/criminal law and an administrative law
branch – have doubts about the constitutional validity of a statutory provision
to be applied in a matter pending before them, they are obliged to submit an
application to that effect to the Verfassungsgerichtshof.6 The latter can also,
amongst others, provide relief when individual litigants assert that the
administrative courts have rendered a judgment violating their
“constitutionally guaranteed right”.7 Such rights can be found, firstly, in the
Austrian Constitution. In addition, Austria has conferred on the ECHR the
rank of constitutional law, with the corollary that the rights enshrined therein
have the same status and importance as those guaranteed under the national
constitution.8 This means that complainants can assert ECHR rights in
proceedings before the Verfassungsgerichthof and the latter also uses those
rights as yardsticks when reviewing general norms (notably regulations and
legislation) for their validity.
A different situation initially prevailed with regard to EU law. Union law
was considered “simple statutory law” and hence lacking a constitutional
quality.When faced with alleged contradictions betweenAustrian law and the
dictates of Union law, individuals would need to seek relief in the ordinary
courts.9 These courts, the referring court included, had accordingly accepted
the responsibility to determine whether such incompatibilities existed and if
so, would refrain from applying the relevant statutory provisions in the case at
hand.TheVerfassungsgerichtshof, for its part, accepted the classic principle of
Court of Austria: Modern Profiles of an Archetype of Constitutional Review”, 3 Journal of
Comparative Law (2008), 64–79.
5. Cf. Art. 140(3) Austrian Constitution. Similar competences exist as regards regulations
(Verordnungen, Art. 139(3) Austrian Constitution) and treaties (Staatsvertrage, Art. 140a(2)
Austrian Constitution).
6. Art. 89(2)Austrian Constitution.More precisely, such a referral can bemade by appellate
courts within the civil/criminal law branch, the supreme court, the administrative court,
independent administrative tribunals, the asylum court, and the federal procurement authority,
Art. 140(1) Austrian Constitution.
7. Art. 144(1) Austrian Constitution. Art. 144a grants a similar competence in relation to
judgments by the asylum court.
8. Art. III of the amendment to the Austrian Constitution (Federal Law Gazette 59/1964).
9. Cf. Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 8 Mar. 2000, VfSlg. 15.753/2000;
Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 15 June 2000, VfSlg. 15.810/2000 and in particular
Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 26 June 1997, VfSlg.14.886/1997), on which e.g. Dopsch,
“EU-Law Infringements in Austria: Constitutional review restricted”, 7 Vienna Journal on
International Constitutional Law (2013), 73–78.
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the primacy of EU law,10 but had declared that rules of Union law could not be
relied upon as a standard for review in constitutional adjudication.11
However, in a 2012 landmark decision,12 the Verfassungsgerichtshof
abandoned that position as far as the Charter of Fundamental Rights is
concerned.13 It declared that the rights enshrined therein are available as
yardsticks for reviewing the validity of general legal norms and that
individuals seeking to impugn an administrative ruling for violating their
constitutionally guaranteed rights may claim a breach of Charter rights for this
purpose. The Verfassungsgerichtshof found that there was considerable
substantive overlap between the rights enshrined in the Charter and those
deemed worthy of protection under Austrian constitutional law, pointing out
that the former are inter alia modelled after the ECHR which has
constitutional status inAustria. In drawing out the procedural ramifications of
this finding, the Verfassungsgerichtshof sought to give effect to the EU
principle of equivalence. It held that Charter rights should be safeguarded by
means of “proceedings that exist for comparable rights deriving from the legal
order of the Member States”.14 Since the Austrian Constitution generally
entrusts the Verfassungsgerichtshof with the exclusive competence to decide
on claims alleging a violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights, it should
similarly be able to assess the conformity of domestic legal norms and
decisions with Charter rights and provide relief in case of a breach: “[T]he
Constitutional Court . . . takes the Charter of Fundamental Rights in its scope
of application as a standard for national law and sets aside contradicting
general norms according to [the Austrian Constitution]. In this manner, the
Constitutional Court fulfils its obligation to remove from the domestic legal
10. See e.g. Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 24 Feb. 1999, VfSl. 15.427/1999;
Grabenwarter, “National Constitutional Law relating to the European Union”, in von
Bogdandy and Bast (Eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (Hart, 2009), p.
85.
11. See Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 8 Mar. 2000, VfSl. 15.753/2000;
Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 15 June 2000, VfSl. 15.810/2000.
12. The Verfassungsgerichtshof itself was clearly of the opinion that the judgment would be
of keen interest to a non-Austrian audience, as this was its first ever decision to be fully
translated in English.
13. Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 14 March 2012, VfSl. 19.632/2012, on which e.g.
Potacs, “Rechte der EU-Grundrechte-Charta als verfassungsgesetzlich gewährleistete Rechte”,
134 Juristische Blätter (2012), 503–511; Bren, “VfGH versus Unionsrecht, Unionsrechtliche
Würdigung des Grundrechterkenntnisses”, (2012) Österreichische Juristen-Zeitung, No. 120;
Heller, “Die Anwendung der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union durch den
Verfassungsgerichtshof ”, 134 Juristische Blätter (2012), 675–680; Pöschl,
“Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit nach Lissabon. Anmerkungen zum Charta-Erkenntnis des
VfGH”, 67 ZöR (2012), 587–609.
14. Ibid., para 29, referring to Case C-34/02, Sante Pasquini v. Instituto nazionale delle
previdenza sociale (INPS), EU:C:2003:366.
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order provisions incompatible with Community law, which is also postulated
by the Court of Justice of the European Union”.15
Although the Verfassungsgerichtshof did not specifically address the
consequences of its holding for the regular judiciary, theOberster Gerichtshof
in its preliminary reference explained that the corollary is that regular courts
must apply to the Verfassungsgerichtshof to have statutes considered to
conflict with the Charter struck down; they are not able to disapply such
legislation of their own motion. Since it was uncertain whether the
Verfassungsgerichtshof’s reading of the principle of equivalence was indeed
correct, the Oberster Gerichtshof accordingly decided to solicit the ECJ’s
view on this matter.
4. Opinion ofAdvocate General Bot
The Advocate General decided first to tackle the questions concerning the
interpretation of Article 24 of Regulation 44/2001, reasoning that the
operationalization of the principle of equivalence in Austrian constitutional
case law would only need to be addressed if this Article is found to preclude
the effect thatAustrian legislation ascribed to the actions of a representative in
absentia. The Advocate General suggested that this was indeed the case,
because for proceedings to be compatible with the rights of defence the
defendant himself must have made the deliberate and conscious choice to
accept the jurisdiction of a court not otherwise competent to adjudicate the
case.As we shall see, the Court reached the same conclusion and its reasoning
featured several of the points also made in the Opinion.
It was clear that in the absence of a definition in Regulation 44/2001, the
term “appearance” in Article 24 should be interpreted autonomously under
Union law. In so doing, the Advocate General took his cue from the scheme
and objectives of the Regulation in question. He noted that the possibility of
jurisdictional prorogation under Article 24 was a departure from the normal
jurisdictional rules and should therefore be construed narrowly.Moreover, the
Union legislature had sought to put in place a jurisdictional scheme that would
create a high level of predictability, whereby defendants should in principle be
sued in their place of domicile. TheAdvocate General proceeded to point out
that choosing to forego this right, by entering an appearance before a court in
another Member State, has serious consequences, in that the defendant is
deprived of the possibility of later objecting to the enforcement of the
judgment handed down in any of the EU Member States. This made it
“essential that the tacit prorogation of the jurisdiction of the court of aMember
15. Ibid., para 43 (internal citations omitted).
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State be accepted only if all the parties to the dispute – and, above all, the
defendant – have deliberately chosen that jurisdiction instead of the court
which would normally have jurisdiction under the rules laid down in
Regulation No 44/2001.”16 However, the appointment of a representative in
absentia was envisaged precisely to cater for situations where the defendant
was unaware that proceedings were brought against him and hence in no
position personally to consent or object to the international jurisdiction of the
court seized by the applicant. The Advocate General thought it misconceived
to look to such a representative as a proper agent for the defendant, as such a
representative is necessarily deprived of information that only the defendant
has or knows about, including facts that could be instrumental in challenging
the international jurisdiction of the court. So the Austrian rule that attributed
an appearance by a court-appointed representative in absentia to the defendant
for the purposes of establishing international jurisdiction, with all the
ramifications this entails, would result in “proceedings that are not in
conformity with Article 47 of the Charter, which is unacceptable.”17 It would
furthermore “be tantamount to recognizing the jurisdiction of a court of a
Member State which has no connecting factor whatsoever with the actual
dispute”, which was surely not what the Union legislature had envisaged
when adopting Regulation 44/2001.
Having reached this conclusion, the Advocate General discussed the first
question referred. The Opinion notes that accepting the Charter as a standard
of constitutional review was “attributable solely to the will of the Member
State concerned” rather than an obligation under Union law.18 However, a
State’s discretion in designing the procedural arrangements to give effect to
this choice is circumscribed by the classic Simmenthal obligation. This meant
that a requirement for ordinary judges to refer statutes to the constitutional
court for scrutiny would be compatible with Union law provided this did not
lead to “any abolition, suspension, diminution or deferral” of their duty to give
16. Opinion, para 42 (emphasis added).
17. The A.G. also canvassed some ancillary arguments in further support of this
conclusion: (i) it was in line with earlier case law permitting a regime whereby respect for the
plaintiff ’s right to an effective remedy meant that proceedings could be initiated against an
absent defendant, while the latter’s right to defence was safeguarded because although a
representative appeared on his behalf, he was still considered to have been absent from the
proceedings, so that a subsequent challenge to the recognition of the judgment remained
possible under the Regulation; (ii) the rationale of Art. 26 of the Regulation, which requires a
court of its own motion to deny jurisdiction when the defendant has not entered an appearance;
(ii) the Union legislature with this Regulation had sought to avoid situations, such as in the
present case, whereby the courts of a Member State (Austria) with no connecting factor
whatsoever to the dispute (these all pointed toKazakhstan) would nevertheless have jurisdiction
to decide the case.
18. Opinion, para 62.
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full effect to EU law, including by refraining from applying incompatible
domestic rules or engaging the ECJ.19
TheAdvocate General clearly struggled to understand the logic behind the
Verfassungsgerichtshof’s implementation of the principle of equivalence in
relation to the Charter. He considered that the remedy of disapplying national
rules incompatible with Union law was in fact more favourable for litigants
than petitioning the Verfassungsgerichtshof to have the objectionable
provisions struck down, as the latter would be more cumbersome and entail
additional expense and delay for the parties to the dispute. These
considerations led him to the conclusion that “as it would have the paradoxical
effect of weakening the principle of the primacy of EU law, the principle of
equivalence, as construed in the order for reference and in a situation such as
that described, has no place here.”20
5. The judgment of the Court of Justice
Unlike its Advocate General, the ECJ followed the order in which the
referring court had posed its questions. It also devoted a larger part of its
judgment to reflections on the procedural powers of ordinary courts when
confronted with a national rule in breach of Union law, taking the opportunity
to offer elaborate restatements of settled case law.These facts seem to suggest
that the Court considered the first question as most in need of its attention,
although its answer, as we shall see, was not always strictly on point.
The Court started by noting that although the referring court had framed its
questionwith exclusive reference to the principle of equivalence, in actual fact
it sought to ascertain the conformity of the Verfassungsgerichtshof’s case law
with the primacy of Union law and the obligations of ordinary courts under
Article 267 TFEU. Having thus broadened the parameters for assessment, the
Court reminded the referring court of the essential features of the preliminary
reference procedure and the primacy principle. It repeated its well-known
mantra that “national courts have the widest discretion in referring matters to
[it]”21 and recalled its settled Simmenthal case law. National courts have a duty
to ensure the full effectiveness of applicable Union law, which may require
them to disapply incompatible provisions of national law. This they must be
able to do immediately, and any impediment in this regard, be it in the form of
a legal provision or legislative, administrative or judicial practice, whether
permanent or temporary, is incompatible with the very essence of EU law.
19. Ibid., para 70.
20. Ibid., para 69.
21. Judgment, para 35.
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The Court then turned to the specific situation where a national legal rule is
considered to offend both Union law and the national constitution, and
ordinary courts are required to apply to the constitutional court for resolution
of the latter conflict. It reiterated its findings in Melki,22 in which it had
formulated the conditions under which the use of such a domestic preliminary
reference procedure would be in line with EU law. Regular courts must be free
to decide whether and when to refer the case to the ECJ; to protect the rights of
the parties to the proceedings in the interim if necessary; and to refrain from
applying conflicting national legal provisions at the close of the domestic
interlocutory procedure.
The ECJ finally focused on the specific situation where national legislation
“the content of which merely transposes the mandatory provisions of an EU
directive” can be reviewed for its compatibility with constitutionality
protected fundamental rights as well as the Charter. In such an event, courts
within the meaning of Article 267(3) TFEU must in principle first refer the
question of the validity of the directive to the ECJ, before any internal review
of the constitutionality of the national implementing legislation can take
place, unless the national court that initiated this internal procedure had
already engaged the ECJ on this matter. This is a rather curious part of the
Court’s reasoning, given that the provision of Union law at stake in the case
was found in a regulation – not a directive – and that the preliminary question
concerned the interpretation – not the validity – of this EU rule. The Court
concluded its discussion of the topic of overlapping spheres of fundamental
rights protection with a confirmation of Melloni:23 national fundamental
rights can be enforced whereMember States have discretion in giving effect to
EU law, provided this does not affect the protection available under the Charter
and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of Union law.24
The analysis of the principle of equivalence was kept to a single paragraph,
with the Court merely stating that reliance on this principle “may not relieve
the national courts, in the application of domestic procedural rules, of their
duty to observe in full the requirements flowing from Article 267 TFEU”.25
This formulation contrasted with the approach taken by the Advocate
General, who had made the Simmenthal obligation the linchpin of his
discussion of the equivalence principle. The Court concluded that a
mandatory referral to the constitutional court to have legislation deemed
incompatible with the Charter struck down would be in breach of EU law to
the extent that other national courts were no longer able to make use ofArticle
267 TFEU. Conversely, the
22. Joined Cases C-188 & 189/10, Aziz Melki, para 57.
23. Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2013:107, para 60.
24. Judgment, para 44.
25. Ibid., para 45.
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requirement to initiate a domestic preliminary reference procedure for
constitutionality control would pass muster if the threeMelki conditions were
observed. Whether this was the case with the Austrian provision mandating
the involvement of the Verfassungsgerichtshof in the event of reservations
about the constitutional validity of a statutory provision was for the referring
court to determine.
The Court had little difficulty disposing of the remaining questions, dealing
with the inference that the contested national rules drew from appearances by
representatives in absentia for the purposes of establishing the international
jurisdiction of the Austrian courts. It reiterated many of the arguments the
Advocate General had put forward in his Opinion. Thus, the Court first
emphasized that a precondition for valid prorogation under Article 24 of the
Regulation is that this must be a deliberate choice on the part of the defendant,
which cannot be said to be the case in the event of an appearance entered by a
representative in absentiawhose appointment the defendant was not aware of.
It also drew attention to the aims pursued by Regulation 44/2001, noting that
conferring international jurisdiction on courts not otherwise competent on the
basis of an appearance entered by such a representative “cannot be regarded as
predictable”.26 The Court further pointed out that the Regulation only obliges
courts to verify their international jurisdiction when the defendant has not
entered an appearance. Respect for the rights of defence demands that when a
defendant is represented by an agent he has not appointed during proceedings
initiated without his knowledge, he must “be regarded as a defendant in
default of appearance”.27 The Court finally did not agree with the applicants
that respect for their right to an effective remedy warranted rules such as those
of the Austrian ZPO. While it had in earlier case law accepted the possibility
of litigating against an absent defendant to safeguard that right, this had not
come at the expense of the latter’s rights of defence, since the recognition of
judgments given in default of appearance can be opposed under the provisions
of the Regulation.28 In contrast, by attributing an appearance by a
representative in absentia to the defendant, theAustrian rules would not allow
the resultant judgment to be classified as one given in default of appearance,
and hence open to challenge under Regulation 44/2001. The Court thus
concluded that the contested national provisions “[could] not be regarded as
striking a fair balance between the rights to an effective remedy and the rights
of the defence.”29
26. Ibid., para 57.
27. Ibid., para 56.
28. Case C-327/10, Hypotecˇní banka a.s. v. Udo Mike Lindner, EU:C:2011:745, paras.
49–54; Case C-292/10, G v. Cornelius de Visser, EU:C:2012:142, paras. 55–57.
29. Judgment, para 60.
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6. Comments
Themost interesting point about the decision in A v. B and Others is, arguably,
not the resolution of the question how the notion “appearance” should be
interpreted: the conclusion that it does not cover actions of a representative
who has not been instructed by an absent defendant or provided by the latter
with the necessary information to mount an effective defence is neither
unexpected nor controversial.30 This case note will focus instead on the other
issue that commanded the Court’s attention: the procedural powers that
national courts should be able to exercise to uphold EU law. In addition, it is
salutary to discuss the use of the Charter as a standard of review in
constitutional proceedings. Although not directly addressed by the Court in
A v. B and Others, it was the decision by the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof
to accept that role for the Charter that prompted the referring court to
formulate its first preliminary question and this will arguably have been on the
mind of the judges and the Advocate General when they crafted their reply
to the Oberster Gerichtshof. An important question in this regard is
whether it is attractive for other constitutional courts to emulate the
Verfassungsgerichtshof’s approach in view of the strict conditions, as outlined
by the ECJ, that any related domestic procedural arrangements must comply
with to be acceptable under EU law.
6.1. National procedural constitutional rules under European scrutiny
From the onset of the integration process, the regular judiciary has been
provided with various tools aimed at upholding the primacy and effet utile of
EU law. In pursuit of its aim to boost the judicial enforcement of EU law, the
Court has ruled on several challenges to the procedural framework governing
the relationship between constitutional courts and the regular judiciary that
have empowered the latter at the former’s expense. The locus classicus is the
decision in Simmenthal, establishing that every national court has the
obligation to refrain from applying domestic legislation found to be
inconsistent with EU law, where necessary after receiving guidance from
the ECJ.31 This ruling brought about the uneasy co-existence of two systems
of judicial control in the majority of the Member States, each designed
according to a different institutional logic: a system of diffuse judicial
30. The relevance of the Court’s ruling on this issue for the pending dispute is furthermore
limited: although A would have been able to avoid the tort action brought against him in the
Austrian courts, B and Others can be said to have already obtained their “pound of flesh” in the
meantime.
31. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA,
EU:C:1978:49.
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scrutiny of legislation in light of EU law, including the Charter, performed by
all national courts under the auspices and guidance of the ECJ; and a system of
centralized review of the constitutionality of statutes, entrusted to specialized
constitutional courts.
In the recent past, ordinary courts in several Member States have inquired
about the application of the Simmenthal principle to the procedural regime
governing constitutional adjudication. In Winner Wetten32 and Filipiak,33 the
Court held that when a national constitutional court has declared the
unconstitutionality of domestic legal provisions, but temporarily maintains
their legal effect to grant the legislature some reprieve, this does not exempt
regular courts from their European obligation to immediately refrain from
applying those same provisions in the dispute before them if found also to
conflict with rules of Union law. Its subsequent decision in Križan explained
that the binding authority that attaches to constitutional judgments cannot
deprive regular courts of their power to send preliminary questions and, what
is more, those courts need not follow rulings handed down by the
constitutional courts that they consider to be contrary to EU law.34 These
judgments showed the ECJ forcefully defending an absolute and
unconditional understanding of the primacy principle in its procedural guise.
A slightly more accommodating stance is evident in Melki, which dealt
with the concurrence of the EU preliminary reference mechanism and
domestic interlocutory procedures for reviewing the constitutionality of
statutes.35 The Court held that the priority nature ascribed to such procedures
was contrary to EU law insofar as regular courts would lose their ability to
make use of Article 267 TFEU.Yet, in a small attenuation of its Simmenthal
case law, the Court allowed mandatory referrals from ordinary and
administrative courts to the constitutional court and accepted some delay in
the immediacy of addressing the EU dimension of the case, provided certain
strict conditions are met. To recap: ordinary courts must remain free to submit
a request for a preliminary ruling at a moment of their own choosing; be able
to take provisional measures to ensure proper protection for the rights that the
parties to the case derive from EU law; and, even after the conclusion of the
interlocutory procedure, remain fully competent to refuse the application of
domestic legal provisions that they consider to breach EU law.
It is clear that the ECJ’s Fifth Chamber took Melki as the template for the
decision in the present case: six of the total twelve paragraphs of the Court’s
32. Case C-409/06,WinnerWetten.
33. Case C-314/08, Filipiak.
34. Case C-416/10, Jozef Križan and Others v. Slovenská inšpekcia životného prostredia,
EU:C:2013:8.
35. Joined Cases C-188 & 189/10, Aziz Melki.
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legal analysis were taken verbatim from that earlier judgment, and the
conclusion, with its listing of the requirements that must be observed for a
domestic interlocutory procedure to be compatible with EU law, reads like a
carbon copy of that inMelki.36 Yet it would be too quick to conclude that, from
a domestic perspective, the implications of the present decision andMelki are
the same. This is because the French interlocutory procedure scrutinized in
Melki and the Austrian regime at issue in this case do not function in exactly
the same way.37
The referring court in Melki (the Cour de cassation) suggested that when
the French Conseil constitutionnel receives a question regarding the validity
of a statute, it not only assesses that statute’s compatibility with the French
Constitution but also examines its consistency with EU law.38 In a judgment
handed down before the ECJ delivered its preliminary ruling, the Conseil
constitutionnel however rejected this reading of its case law.39 It reiterated its
established position40 that as a rule, reviewing legislation against international
and European law is the prerogative of the ordinary courts.41 In practice, then,
the French regime envisages two separate tracks, with the Conseil
constitutionnel in charge of all matters constitutional and the regular judiciary
responsible for upholding EU law. While a similar situation used to exist in
36. The belief on the part of the Court and theA.G. that the issue raised in the first question
was merely a variation on a familiar theme – that of the powers of regular courts pursuant to
Simmenthal, particularly when faced with the concurrence of an interlocutory procedure for
constitutionality control and a preliminary reference under Art. 267 TFEU – in relation to
which existing case law provides sufficient guidance, presumably explains why the case was
dealt with by a Chamber of five judges and not escalated to the Grand Chamber for decision.
37. That the two procedures were different was also pointed out by the Oberster
Gerichtshof in its reference, but this did not elicit any response from the ECJ.
38. For an analysis of this reference from the domestic perspective, see e.g. Mehdi,
“French supreme courts and European Union law: Between historical compromise and
accepted loyalty”, 48 CML Rev. (2011), 439–473; Dyevre, “The Melki Way: The Melki Case
and Everything You Always Wanted to Know About French Judicial Politics (But Were
Afraid to Ask)” in Claes, de Visser, Popelier and Van de Heyning (Eds.), Constitutional
Conversations in Europe – Actors, Topics, Procedures (Intersentia, 2012).
39. CC 12 May 2010, 2010-605 DC.
40. First set out in CC 15 Jan. 1975, 74-54 DC.
41. The Conseil constitutionnel has accepted a narrow exception to this position. In CC 10
June 2004, 2004-496 DC, it interpreted Art. 88-1 French Constitution as containing a
constitutional obligation to implement EU directives into national law. The Conseil
constitutionnel accordingly considers itself competent to assess whether this obligation is
respected, including by declaring that a statutory provision infringesArt. 88-1 “if this provision
is obviously incompatible with the Directive which it is intended to transpose”, cf. CC 27 July
2006, 2006-540 DC. In that same case, the Conseil constitutionnel indicated that it will in
principle refrain from assessing the implementing law against the Constitution – as this would
in fact amount to reviewing the constitutionality of the EU directive in question – except to
ensure that the transposition of a directive does not breach a “rule or principle inherent to the
constitutional identity of France” (para 19).
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Austria, the 2012 Charter decision of the Verfassungsgerichtshof has brought
about a joining of those two tracks, with the interlocutory procedure for
constitutionality control also recognized as having an EU dimension. What
does this mean in terms of ensuring compliance with theMelki requirements?
The crux lies in the phrase “at the end of the interlocutory procedure” that
appears in the first and third condition. Even after the Verfassungsgerichtshof
has decided whether a statute ought to be struck down for violating the
Charter, regular Austrian courts must still be able to make use of Article 267
TFEU and perform their Simmenthal duty. It is clear that when the relevant
legislation has been struck down, the question of its non-applicability to the
pending case has become moot and there will typically be little incentive for
the regular courts to “resurrect” the law by consulting the ECJ on whether it
was actually compatible with the Charter. The more interesting scenario is
where the Verfassungsgerichtshof has declined to declare that a law is invalid
for being contrary to the Charter. In such a case,A v.BandOthers clarifies that
the regular courts should be able to challenge that finding, by nevertheless
refusing to apply that law because they do consider it to be in breach of the
Charter, which would entail disregarding the binding effect ascribed to
constitutional court judgments in line withKrižan, if necessary after receiving
the backing from the ECJ following a preliminary reference.42 In contrast, the
strict separation between constitutionality control and review for conformity
with EU law, including the Charter, in the French systemmeans that observing
the third condition in that Member State’s judicial order “is unproblematic”.43
It is further important to realize that if the Austrian regime is construed in
conformity with theMelki conditions, which appears to be possible,44 the ECJ
allows a mandatory interlocutory procedure the aim of which is to enable the
constitutional court to purge statutes that are contrary to the Charter from the
national legal order. By choosing to applyMelki to decide A v. B and Others,
the Court can thus be seen to put a further gloss on its Simmenthal case law by
accepting that the right of the court hearing the case not to apply conflicting
national rules may exceptionally be deferred until the conclusion of such an
interlocutory procedure, since the full effect of EU law can in the interim be
safeguarded through the ordering of provisional measures.45 In this regard, the
42. The ECJ recently underscored the possibility for regular courts to initiate Art. 267
TFEU proceedings after the conclusion of the domestic constitutionality check in Case C-5/14,
Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Osnabrück, EU:C:2015:354, para 35,
referring to its ruling in this case.
43. Bossuyt and Verrijdt, “The full effect of EU Law and of Constitutional Review in
Belgium and France after the Melki Judgment”, 7 EuConst (2011), 355–391, at 378.
44. See also the text accompanying notes 74 and 75 infra.
45. Cf. Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame
Ltd and others, EU:C:1990:257.
CML Rev. 201514 Case Law
Court’s approach differed from that advocated in the Opinion. The Advocate
General favoured a strict application of Simmenthal, holding that the right of
each and every national court to ignore conflicting national provisions in
handling specific disputes could not be tampered with in any way. In this vein,
the Advocate General also met the Verfassungsgerichtshof’s reading of the
equivalence principle: the Verfassungsgerichtshof had relied on this principle
to justify why the sanction of annulment should be available not only when
domestic legislation encroaches upon constitutionally protected fundamental
rights, but also when it impinges on the rights and liberties guaranteed by the
Charter. Agreeing with the observations made by the referring court, the
Advocate General opined that the remedy of the immediate inapplicability of
objectionable national legislation was in fact more favourable for litigants
than having this law annulled by a constitutional court. To support this
assertion he pointed to the expense and additional delays involved in obtaining
a declaration of invalidity. Such downsides are obviously unappealing.
Although none were mentioned in the Opinion, there are however also
redeeming features about the route to the constitutional court to secure a law’s
annulment.
A decision not to apply a statute declared incompatible with EU law made
by courts at the lower rungs of the judicial hierarchy is not binding on higher
courts, and is even susceptible to being overruled. In the interval, the litigating
parties, and others in a similar position, may need to contend with a lack of
legal certainty. Judgments handed down by constitutional courts, however, are
as a rule binding for all other State organs. They definitively settle the matter
for both pending and future cases, and ensure uniformity in the approach taken
by the regular judiciary. In certain instances the delay attendant upon
involving the constitutional court would also be manageable, such as when a
first instance court immediately initiates the interlocutory proceedings, as
well as when the constitutional court is under an obligation to render its
judgment within a fixed period of time. These features may well sway certain
litigants to prefer the striking down of problematic national provisions to these
being set aside.
The difference between the Opinion and the judgment is in part caused by
the formulation of the question to be answered. TheAdvocate General firmly
followed the referring court, which sought to know whether the principle of
equivalence “compelled”46 a mandatory referral to the constitutional court to
secure the invalidation of a statute instead of disapplication in accordancewith
the primacy principle. Framed in this way, the issue in effect becomes whether
the constitutional court should be the exclusive guardian of EU law at the
domestic level; an “either-or” type of question – which was precisely the
46. Opinion, para 59.
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model the Court rejected in Simmenthal: it will be recalled that in Simmenthal
the pretore di Susa inquired whether it was acceptable under the doctrines of
primacy and direct effect for the resolution of a conflict between a statute and
European law to be considered the exclusive preserve of the Italian Corte
costituzionale. The ECJ, however, decided to recast the question in A v. B and
Others as whether “Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding rules
of national law”47 that demand the initiation of an interlocutory procedure to
render conflicting statutes invalid. By selecting Article 267 TFEU as the
ultimate assessment criterion, the Court deftly managed to avoid the kind of
counterbalancing of the advantages associated with invalidity as compared to
inapplicability as the preferred remedy for fundamental rights violations that
would arguably have been expected for an analysis based on the equivalence
principle. Instead of getting bogged down in “either-or” thinking, the Court’s
chosen approach enabled it to confirm that EU law opposes concentrating
responsibility for enforcing Union law in the hands of a constitutional court,
while simultaneously accepting declarations of invalidity by such a court as an
additional technique for upholding Charter rights at the domestic level.
In addition, the line of reasoning advanced in the judgment made it possible
for the Court to avoid indirectly attacking the 2012 Charter decision of the
Verfassungsgerichtshof. It had good reason to resist the invitation of the
referring court to do so: leaving aside considerations of a possible concern for
judicial comity, the 2012 decision has been hailed as Euro-friendly in
accepting the Charter as a standard for constitutional review.48 The then
Commissioner for Justice, for instance, urged other constitutional courts to
follow the “Austrian model of Charter incorporation” for the benefit of
“Europe and its citizens”.49 It will not have been lost on the Court that a greater
role for the Charter serves its own institutional interest as the ultimate
interpreter and supreme guardian of the Charter – a role that it underscored in
Melloni.50 Yet, the 2012 decision did also include some assertions by the
Verfassungsgerichtshof that will have been received with less equanimity by
the ECJ.
47. Judgment, para 28.
48. Although the scholarly reception of the judgment in Austria has been described as less
“euphoric”, with criticism notably directed at the Verfassungsgerichtshof’s use of the principle
of equivalence as the linchpin of its reasoning, so Öhlinger, “Verfassungsrecht: Vorlagepflicht
bei Verstoß eines nationalen Gesetzes gegen Art. 47 GRCh”, (2014) EuZW, 950–956, at 956.
49. Reding, “Observations on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the future of the
European Union”, (XXV FIDE Congress, 31 May 2012).
50. Case C-399/11,Melloni, para 60.
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6.2. It’s all about dialogue – and institutional self-interest
Among the various European constitutional courts, while not equalling the
exceptionally Eurofriendly Belgian Cour constitutionnelle,51 the Austrian
Verfassungsgerichtshof has to date been particularly accepting of the Court’s
preliminary ruling jurisdiction. Since its first reference in 1999,52 it has
proceeded to consult the ECJ on several other occasions.53 In its 2012 Charter
decision, the Verfassungsgerichtshof at the outset confirmed its enduring
willingness to initiate Article 267 TFEU proceedings if interpretative
problems arise under the Charter.54 It however immediately proceeded to add
a rider, outlining when it considered itself exempt from soliciting the Court’s
view on the meaning of the rights and liberties protected by the Charter.
Article 267 TFEU specifies that the initiation of the procedure set out in that
provision presupposes that a ruling by the Court is “necessary to enable [the
referring court] to give judgment”. Using a contrario reasoning, the
Verfassungsgerichtshof explained that a preliminary ruling could “have no
impact on the decision of the case …. if a constitutionally guaranteed right,
especially a right of the ECHR, has the same scope of application as a right of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In such a case, the Constitutional Court
will base its decision on the Austrian Constitution without there being a need
for reference for a preliminary ruling under the terms ofArticle 267 TFEU.”55
To support this construction of the obligation to refer, the
Verfassungsgerichtshof relied on the interpretative duties that the Charter
encapsulates in Article 52 – the meaning and scope of Charter rights
corresponding to ECHR rights should be the same, although the Union may
offer more extensive protection; and rights derived from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States must be read in harmony with those
traditions – and the assurance provided by Article 53 that “the level of
protection of existing fundamental rights guarantees is not lowered by the
Charter”.56 Given the Verfassungsgerichtshof’s conception of the Charter
as largely modelled after the ECHR – which, it will be recalled, was an
51. The Belgian court’s own website contains a helpful overview of the many cases in
which it has made use of Art. 267 TFEU. See further e.g. Popelier, “Judicial Conversations in
Multilevel Constitutionalism. The Belgian Case” in Claes et al., op. cit. supra note 38.
52. Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 10 Mar. 1999, VfSl. 15.450/1999, with the Court’s
answer provided in Case C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer
Zementwerke GmbH v. Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten, EU:C:2001:598.
53. See e.g. Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 12 Dec. 2000, VfSl. 16.050/2000;
Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 2 Mar. 2001, VfSl. 16.100/2001; Verfassungsgerichtshof,
decision of 28 Nov. 2012, VfSl. 19.702/2012.
54. Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 14 March 2012 cited supra note 13, para 40.
55. Ibid., para 44.
56. Ibid., para 45.
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important reason to accept the former as a constitutional standard – the ECJ
would be forgiven for thinking that what the Austrian court gave with one
hand, it took away with the other.
This is corroborated by the manner in which the Verfassungsgerichtshof
applied its approach to Article 267 TFEU in its Charter ruling.57 The case
concerned two asylum seekers, who alleged that their right to an effective
remedy and fair trial, as guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter, had been
violated when the competent Austrian court dismissed their complaint
against the rejection of their asylum applications without holding an oral
hearing. While Article 47 is based on Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, the
Verfassungsgerichtshof acknowledged that the Charter offersmore protection,
inter alia in that the right to a fair hearing is also available in proceedings other
than those concerning civil rights and obligations – such as asylum cases.58
This meant that ECtHR case law could not be relied on for guidance. More
importantly, the meaning to be ascribed to Article 47 in asylum
proceedings has not conclusively been dealt with by the Court or in secondary
EU law. Although it would accordingly have been expected to refer an
interpretation question to the ECJ pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, the
Verfassungsgerichtshof declined to do so. Commentators have noted that this
did not bode well for the frequency with which the Verfassungsgerichtshof
would request preliminary rulings regarding the Charter in the future.59
What is more, by positioning itself as the supreme guardian of the Charter
within theAustrian constitutional order, theVerfassungsgerichtshof’s decision
was liable to affect the relationship between the ordinary Austrian judiciary
and the ECJ negatively. Given the overriding importance that it attributes to
Article 267 TFEU for ensuring the uniform and effective application ofUnion
law and consolidating its own position at the apex of the European judicial
system,60 the ECJ will arguably have felt the need to respond; and the referral
in A v. B and Others presented it with an opportunity to do so. While its
57. See also e.g. Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 29 Sept. 2012, VfSl. 19.673/2012,
under 4.5 and Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 16 Mar. 2013, VfSl. 19.749/2013, under
2.2.7. (finding that the scope of protection of the right to data privacy respectively the freedom
to choose an occupation and business under the Charter and the Constitution is the same, thus
obviating the need for further analysis with reference to the Charter).
58. Ibid., para 59 and the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, O.J.
2007, C 303/17.
59. Klaushofer and Palmstorfer, “Austrian Constitutional Court uses Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union as standard of review: Effects on Union Law”, 19
EPL (2013), 1–11, at 10.
60. See e.g. Opinion 1/09, Draft Agreement on the European and Community Patents
Court, EU:C:2011:123, in particular paras. 83–85; Opinion 2/13, Draft Agreement on
Accession of the European Union to the ECHR, EU:C:2014:2454, notably paras. 196–199.
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judgment in the first place provides the Oberster Gerichtshof with answers to
resolve the dispute before it, the Verfassungsgerichtshof is – albeit indirectly –
a no less important addressee. A v. B and Others thus exemplifies the
dialogue-through-case-law between the ECJ and national constitutional
courts that has been a favoured avenue for judicial exchanges on the
relationship between the European and domestic legal order.61
The ECJ’s message came in three parts. First, the ECJ noted that it is the
ultimate interpreter of the Charter and more particularly of the level of
protection that this instrument offers, here referring to its earlier decision in
Melloni.62 This may be seen as a reply to the argument that there is no need to
use Article 267 TFEU when a constitutionally protected right and a Charter
right “have the same scope of application”. Lest there be any confusion, the
Court can be taken to remind the Verfassungsgerichtshof (and other
constitutional courts inclined to adopt a similar approach) that they cannot
decide for themselves whether such is the case. While it is for constitutional
courts (and other institutions charged with enforcing the domestic bill of
rights) to decide on the reach of national fundamental rights, determining the
scope of application of a Charter right takes place in Luxembourg.This means
that, leaving aside an acte clair or situations where the question has already
been put before the Court,63 the Verfassungsgerichtshof (and its
contemporaries) should not too easily consider itself exempt from the duty to
use Article 267 TFEU. Furthermore, while the Verfassungsgerichtshof was
correct in understanding Article 53 as not giving it a licence to read “down”
the protection already offered by existing fundamental rights, with the
reference toMelloni – decided after the Verfassungsgerichtshof handed down
its Charter ruling – the ECJ may have wished to make sure that the Austrian
court also understood the position under EU lawwhen domestic constitutional
rights give more protection than the Charter.
Secondly, the ECJ sought to defend itsFoto-Frost prerogative to strike down
EU secondary law.64 When a national constitutional court contemplates the
annulment of a statute that merely implements the mandatory provisions of a
directive for infringing constitutional norms, it in a sense also calls into
question the validity of the underlying EUmeasure.As such, it ought to make
61. See e.g. Martinico, “Judging in the multilevel legal order: Exploring the Techniques of
‘Hidden Dialogue’”, 21 King’s Law Journal (2010), 257–281; Guarnieri and Piana, “Bringing
the outside inside: Macro and micro factors to put the dialogue among the highest courts into
its right context”, 8 Utrecht Law Review (2012), 139–157.
62. Judgment, para 44 and Case C-399/11,Melloni, para 60.
63. Cf. Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health,
EU:C:1982:335.
64. Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, EU:C:1987:452.
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a reference to enable the Court to decide on the fate of that directive.65 In
Melki, the Court explained that this duty applies whenever the grounds for
challenging the implementing legislation can similarly be asserted to impugn
the directive.66 In the judgment annotated here, it clarifies that this is the case
when such a statute is questioned for its compatibility with fundamental rights
that are protected under the domestic constitution and guaranteed by the
Charter.67 It follows that constitutional courts are exempt from the obligation
to make a preliminary reference where the objections brought against the
domestic statute have no counterpart in Union law, for instance pertaining to
procedural irregularities in the making of that statute. In the majority of cases,
however, challengers of legislation will also or instead invoke violations of
substantive law – such as incompatibility with fundamental rights – to support
their claim of unconstitutionality, since invalidation on procedural grounds
typically provides only temporary relief in that nothing bars the legislature
from passing a statute with the same content. In the post-Charter context, it is
thus to be expected that this precondition for the duty to refer a validity
question – grounds that can be asserted against the implementing legislation
and the directive – will more often than not be met.
It is further submitted that the mere fact that a right laid down in a national
bill of rights has no explicit counterpart in the Charter will not be sufficient to
escape Article 267 TFEU. Otherwise, formalistic reasoning may be deployed
to circumvent the Court’s jurisdiction of substantive EU law matters. The
Court has been known to employ teleological interpretation of primary EU
law to great effect, and there is every reason to expect that it will conceive the
Charter as a “living instrument”, akin to the approach adopted by the ECtHR
in fashioning the meaning to be given to the ECHR.68 Due respect for the
Court’s logic of preserving its Foto-Frost monopoly demands that in such
65. The only exception is when the question of the validity of the implementing legislation
wasreferred to the constitutional court by a regular court, and the latter had already made use of
Art. 267 TFEU, inwhich case the obligation incumbent on the constitutional court is to heed the
ECJ’s preliminary ruling. Failure to do so might render the Member State liable in damages, cf.
Case C-224/01, Gerhard Köbler v. Republik Österreich, EU:C:2003:513, paras. 31 and 33–36
and Case C-173/03, Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v. Repubblica italiana, EU:C:2006:391,
paras. 30–31, or perhaps spur the Commission to initiate infringement proceedings in the event
of a systemic failure to abide by ECJ rulings, akin to what it did in 2004 in relation to the failure
of the Swedish highest court to useArt. 267 TFEU and the absence of domestic rules governing
the making of requests for a preliminary ruling.
66. Joined Cases C-188 & 189/10, Aziz Melki, para 56.
67. Judgment, para 41 read together with para 43.
68. This approach was inaugurated in ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, Appl. No.
5856/72, judgment of 25Apr. 1978, para 31. See e.g. Letsas, “The ECHR as a living instrument:
Its meaning and legitimacy” in Føllesdal, Peters and Ulfstein (Eds.),Constituting Europe –The
European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context (Cambridge
University Press, 2012). The ECtHR’s willingness to “read in” rights not enumerated in the text
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cases, it ought to be asked whether the Charter (or any other source of EU law)
should be read as providing a guarantee analogous to the fundamental right
protected under national constitutional law that could be used to reviewUnion
legislative instruments. An affirmative answer would trigger the duty to refer
a follow-up request for a ruling on the validity of the relevant EU directive.69
While the Verfassungsgerichtshof had confirmed the relevance for the
Court to be able to decide on the validity of EU legislative measures,70 its
decision emphasized the availability of constitutional review of legislation
transposing a directive.71 In A v. B and Others, the ECJ stressed what it had
earlier declared in Melki: the determination of the validity of the directive,
including on fundamental rights grounds, takes priority over adjudicating
claims based on constitutional arguments and directed at the implementing
statute. The autonomy and importance of constitutional courts in handling
challenges to the validity of national implementing legislation is severely
curtailed as a result of this case law.They are expected to consult the ECJ in the
great majority of cases and must subsequently heed the preliminary ruling,
which will largely determine the constitutionality challenge too: when the
Court dismisses allegations of fundamental rights incompatibility as
unfounded, similar grounds are no longer available as a basis for striking down
the implementing legislation and conversely, the annulment of the directive
will have a knock-on effect on the endurance of national laws adopted to
transpose that directive.
It is not unimaginable that the Verfassungsgerichtshof (or other
constitutional courts that also embrace the Charter in constitutional
adjudication) may not comply fully with the ECJ’s diktats, for instance by
adopting too great a latitude in finding that a particular Charter question
qualifies as acte clair or acte éclairé. The last part of the Court’s message may
be seen as seeking to mitigate, if not pre-empt, such an eventuality. It consists
of the enumeration of the competences – making references, ordering interim
relief and not applying national law – that regular courts must be able to
exercise when they are expected under domestic law to petition the
constitutional court for a declaration of invalidity, as discussed earlier. From
of the Convention is clearly evident in ECtHR,Golder v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 4451/70,
judgment of 21 Feb. 1975 (adding the right of access to court to Art. 6 ECHR).
69. Of course, there is every reason to combine the question of the interpretation of the
Charter and the validity of the directive in a single reference, indicating that guidance on the
latter question is sought only in the event that the answer to the first question is positive.
70. Other constitutional courts have been known to strike down implementing legislation on
constitutional grounds without referring a validity question to the Court, as inter alia happened
with the EuropeanArrest Warrant Framework Decision and the Data Retention Directive. See
e.g. Komárek, “European Constitutionalism and the EuropeanArrest Warrant: In Search of the
Limits of ‘Contrapunctual Principles’”, 44 CML Rev. (2007), 9–40.
71. Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 14 March 2012 cited supra note 13, para 42.
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the ECJ’s perspective, the option for regular courts to use Article 267 TFEU
should they so wish, including after the conclusion of the interlocutory
procedure for constitutionality control, means that it is not wholly dependent
on constitutional courts for the supply of Charter-related questions or
questions regarding the validity of EU legislation. It may have further sought
to incentivize constitutional courts to act in line with theMelki conditions.The
choice to rule on Charter or validity questions without consulting the ECJ
exposes national constitutional courts to the risk that regular courts that
disagree with their findings may subsequently decide to initiate Article 267
TFEU,72 with the possible corollary of an ECJ judgment that contradicts and
rebuts the conclusion reached by the constitutional court on the very same
issue. This is clearly not an attractive prospect.73
An intriguing point is that the Verfassungsgerichtshof had acknowledged
the Melki requirements in its Charter decision, and that the ECJ, in turn,
explicitly remarked upon this in its decision in A v.B andOthers. It found that,
on its reading of the Austrian judgment, the obligation to apply to the
Verfassungsgerichtshof to have a statute struck down “did not affect” the right
of ordinaryAustrian courts under EU law to make a preliminary reference, to
provide interim relief and to disapply conflicting provisions of national law,
“as expressed by the Verfassungsgerichtshof in wording borrowed from the
judgment . . . in Melki and Abdeli”.74 This was characterized as one of the
“facts” in the light of which the preliminary question, as re-framed by the
Court, would be answered.75As it happened, no further reference was made to
that finding throughout the analysis, and it was left to the referring court to
decide whether the Austrian model for Charter enforcement could be
construed in line with those very Melki duties. So why did the ECJ still
consider it opportune to reiterate extensive parts of its reasoning in Melki in
72. While regular courts can also decide on their own authority not to apply legislation the
constitutional court has deemed to be in conformity with the Charter, they may prefer to receive
backing from the ECJ before disregarding the binding effect that attaches to constitutional court
rulings. But note Case C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG,
EU:C:2010:21, in which the ECJ held that “[t]he possibility thus given . . . by the second
paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU of asking a preliminary ruling before disapplying the national
provision that is contrary to European Union law cannot, however, be transformed into an
obligation because national law does not allow that court to disapply a provision it considers to
be contrary to the constitution unless the provision has first been declared unconstitutional by
the Constitutional Court.” (para 54).
73. Whether the scenario sketched in themain text will materialize will depend inter alia on
the loyalty of regular courts vis-à-vis the constitutional court and their perception of the latter as
the natural port of call for their fundamental rights questions, as compared with the ECJ, and
this may in part be influenced by their familiarity with the constitutional court’s presence and
procedures.
74. Judgment, para 32.
75. Ibid., para 33.
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this case? One possibility is that it wanted to signal to the
Verfassungsgerichtshof that it expects the latter to respect the spirit of the
Melki conditions, which would mean that the Fifth Chamber harboured some
concerns that the reference in the Austrian decision might have been largely
placatory or rhetorical in nature. It seems more likely that the ECJ sought to
make sure that the Verfassungsgerichtshof properly understood the situations
in which those conditions apply. The latter had mentioned Melki when
asserting that European law did “not stand in the way”76 of interlocutory
proceedings for reviewing the constitutionality of implementing legislation,
provided that the requirements set out in that case were complied with.
However, as explained earlier, theMelki conditions apply whenever domestic
law prioritizes interlocutory procedures for constitutional review over making
a preliminary reference in order to determine the compatibility of legislation
with EU law – and such priority for the domestic review mechanism is
precisely not countenanced when the validity of legislation implementing
mandatory provisions of a directive is at stake.A question that remains is why
the Verfassungsgerichtshof was motivated to revise its position on the use of
EU fundamental rights law in constitutional adjudication, and whether other
constitutional courts may similarly decide to embrace the Charter as a
standard of review.
6.3. The use of the Charter in constitutional adjudication
Austrian commentators have described the Verfassungsgerichtshof’s decision
to accept the Charter as providing relevant criteria for assessing the
constitutionality of legislation as consistent with, and a logical continuation
of, its fundamental rights case law.77 Until the end of the 1970s, the
Verfassungsgerichtshof was regularly criticized for failing to adequately
discharge its mandate as the guardian of fundamental rights.78 It tended to
interpret constitutionally guaranteed rights in a formalistic manner, showing
considerable deference to the legislature and it was willing to grant requests
for annulment only if the contested legislative measure resulted in the total
76. Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 14 March 2012 cited supra note 13, para 42.
77. So e.g. Lachmayer, “The Austrian approach towards European Human Rights”, 7
Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law (2013), 105–107, at 105; Mayr,
“Verfassungsgerichtlicher Prüfungsgegenstand und Prüfungsmaßstab im Spannungsfeld
nationaler, konventions- und unionsrechtlicher Grundrechtsgewährleistungen”, 37 Zeitschrift
für Verwaltung (2012), 401–417, at 409; Bezemek, “Wording and Determinateness –
Indeterminately Worded”, 7 Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law (2013),
95–98, at 95.
78. See e.g. Hausmaninger, The Austrian Legal System, 4th ed. (Manzsche Verlags- und
Universitätsbuchhandlung, 2011), p. 147.
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negation of, or an excessive interference with, the essence of a fundamental
right.79 Austria’s accession to the ECHR was the catalyst in changing the
court’s conception of its role in upholding fundamental rights.The adoption of
the ECHR at the rank of constitutional law and its direct applicability meant
that judgments handed down by the ECtHR took on considerable significance
and the latter’s view of the Convention as a living instrument influenced the
Verfassungsgerichtshof’s fundamental rights doctrine to become more
value-oriented and progressive.80 The “near-identity in substance and
similarity in wording”81 of the Charter and the ECHR thus made it a
seemingly natural choice to extend the treatment granted to the latter under
Austrian law to the former. Doing so would make it possible for the
Verfassungsgerichtshof to ensure that Austrian case law would be internally
coherent in its approach to fundamental rights protected under a multiple of
regimes: Constitution, ECHR and Charter. This line of thinking is clearly
influenced by the domestic treatment of the Convention, and will accordingly
not necessarily carry the same weight, if any, for a constitutional court whose
legal order has opted for a different technique to give effect to the ECHR.82
By accepting the Charter as a ground for constitutional review, the
Verfassungsgerichtshof however also sought to further its own
institutional interest. In Austria, legal protection against allegedly unlawful
decisions by administrative authorities is available in final instance before
the Verwaltungsgerichtshof (supreme administrative court) and the
Verfassungsgerichtshof. The latter can verify the compatibility of contested
acts with constitutional norms, including the ECHR; whereas the former
reviews such measures against “simple statutory law” which, it will be
recalled, includes EU law.83 It should also be noted that these two courts,
together with the referring court in this case, jointly share the position
79. A case that is considered emblematic of this approach concerned a challenge to a newly
introduced provision that decriminalized abortion during the first trimester:
Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 11 Nov. 1974, VfSl. 7400/1974, on which e.g. Waldstein,
“Rechtserkentnis und Rechtsprechnung. Bemerkungen zum Erkenntnis des VfGH über die
Fristenlösung”, 98 Juristische Blätter (1976), 505–512.
80. See e.g. Berka, Verfassungsrecht, 5th ed. (Verlag Österreich, 2014), paras. 1127 et seq.;
Heller, Der Verfassungsgerichtshof – Die Entwichlung der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in
Österreich von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, (Verlag Österreich, 2010), pp. 384 et seq.
81. Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 14 March 2012 cited supra note 13, para 34.
82. The ECHRdoes not prescribe themanner of its implementation and enforcement within
the Contracting States; it only demands that the rights enshrined in the Convention are duly
protected. For an examination of the different approaches that countries have chosen to meet
this obligation, see e.g. Keller and Stone Sweet (Eds.), A Europe of Rights – The Impact of the
ECHR on National Legal Systems, (OUP, 2008); Martinico and Pollicino (Eds.), The National
Judicial Treatment of the ECHR and EU Laws: A Comparative Constitutional Perspective
(Europa Law Publishing, 2010).
83. Cf. Art. 130(1) and Art. 144(1) Austrian Constitution.
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of “highest court” in the Austrian judicial order: the Verfassungsgerichtshof
is not competent to scrutinize the judgments handed down by the
Verwaltungsgerichtshof and the Oberster Gerichtshof for their
constitutionality. The proliferation of fundamental rights within Union law
means that theVerwaltungsgerichtshof too can assess administrative decisions
for their rights conformity (albeit exclusively under the EU regime), thereby
entering what the Verfassungsgerichtshof considered its domain. By
stipulating that Charter rights qualify as constitutionally guaranteed rights, the
Verfassungsgerichtshof sought to repel this jurisdictional incursion and
re-assert its position as the ultimate guardian of fundamental rights within the
Austrian judicial order.84
The perceived need to ensure that ordinary courts accord due respect to the
constitutional court, its role and decisions is not unique to the
Verfassungsgerichtshof. On the contrary, a perusal of case law and doctrine in
other countries with a centralized system of constitutional adjudication
reveals that tension and conflict between ordinary courts (notably supreme
courts) and constitutional tribunals are a relatively common occurrence.85
The ECJ has provided additional ammunition for such tensions to flare, as
recounted earlier, notably with its proclamation of the primacy of Union law
and insistence on the decentralized enforcement of this fundamental principle.
The corollary is that ordinary courts may be able to sideline the constitutional
court when their doubts about the validity of the statute to be applied can be
expressed in constitutional terms – which would require the initiation of
interlocutory proceedings for constitutionality control – and also framed as a
problem of the law’s compatibility with EU law, which they are competent to
resolve on their own authority, where necessary after consulting the ECJ. It is
evident that the Charter has brought about a further overlap between
constitutional and European norms in the area of fundamental rights and has
increased the incidence with which regular courts are presented with the
choice just sketched. This may be particularly unsettling for constitutional
courts, many of which see the enforcement of the domestic rights catalogue as
84. Cf. Fuchs and Segalia, “Grundrechtsschutz durch den Verfassungs- und den
Verwaltungsgerichtshof ” in Heißl (Ed.), Handbuch Menschenrechte (Facultus, 2012). Its
efforts do not appear to have been fully successful: in Verwaltungsgerichtshof, decision of 23
Jan. 2013,VwGH. 2010/15/0196, theAustrian administrative court indicated that it will uphold
the Charter by refraining from applying contrary legislation, without any mention of initiating
the interlocutory procedure for constitutionality control.
85. Garlicki, “Constitutional Courts Versus Supreme Courts”, 5 I-Con (2007), 44–68 even
considers such tensions “a necessary component of every system of centralized judicial review”
(at 63). See also Michelman, “The Interplay of Constitutional and Ordinary Jurisdiction” in
Ginsburg and Dixon (Eds.), Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar, 2011).
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one of their defining tasks86 and realize that their ability to act as a “rights
champion” has been important in securing their popular legitimacy. So should
a constitutional court eager to defend the centralized system of constitutional
adjudication follow suit and also embrace the Charter as a standard of review?
The decision in A v. B and Others did not address the matter of Charter
incorporation as such. Following the referring court, the ECJ limited itself to
analysing the procedural dimension attendant on this choice. This is
understandable: the decision to accept Charter rights in constitutional
adjudication falls within Member States’ constitutional autonomy. EU law
formally adopts an attitude of indifference in this respect, provided that such
choices do not stand in the way of ensuring fulfilment of the obligations
incumbent on the Member States.87 A v. B and Others confirms, in the same
way that the other progeny of Simmenthal have done so, that the autonomy
enjoyed by Member State institutions when it comes to the design and
functioning of a centralized system of constitutional adjudication is in actual
fact far from complete.While the Verfassungsgerichtshofmay be the first port
of call to address the conformity of national legislation with the Charter, the
ordinary courts must be able to get a second bite of the cherry. This need to
respect theMelki conditionsmight make other constitutional courts somewhat
reluctant to embrace the “Austrian model of Charter incorporation”, as part of
a strategy to affirm their position vis-à-vis the regular judiciary.88
Other reasons to do so may, however, be envisaged. In a letter sent to the
Verfassungsgerichtshof after it handed down its Charter decision, the
President of the Court enunciated two such reasons.89 On the one hand, using
the Charter as a standard of review would contribute to making this document
part of the European common good. In this line of thinking, constitutional
courts would – to put it crudely – assist in generating good PR for the Charter
and, more tangentially, boost its social clout by ingraining the Charter in the
collective consciousness of Europe’s citizenry. In a related vein, constitutional
courts are able to purge objectionable statutory provisions from the domestic
86. This holds in particular for those courts that can receive constitutional complaints
brought by individuals in order to vindicate their fundamental rights allegedly violated by the
State.
87. Cf. Art. 4(3) TEU.
88. This should not be taken to mean that no role for the Charter can be envisaged: even
without the status of an independent standard of review, the Charter can be used by
constitutional courts as a valuable source of inspiration in the development and interpretation of
domestic fundamental rights standards, akin to the current practice of several such courts to
construe constitutionally guaranteed rights in the light of the EHCR and Strasbourg case law.
Against constitutional courts’ engagement with the Charter, see Komárek, “Why National
Constitutional Courts ShouldNot Embrace EUFundamental Rights”, (2014) LSELaw, Society
and Economy Working Papers 23/2014.
89. The existence of this letter is mentioned by Öhlinger, op. cit. supra note 48, at 956.
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legal order andwhenever they do so on the ground that the legislation infringes
Charter rights and freedoms, their judgment also benefits individuals in
wholly internal situations where ordinary courts would not have been able to
offer relief under EU law.90 In this manner too, the impact of the Charter and
its visibility at the national level would be strengthened.
Moreover, applying the Charter in constitutional adjudication would
promote cooperation between the ECJ and national constitutional courts for
the benefit of fundamental rights protection in Europe.91 The preferred mode
for such communication would, at least from the ECJ’s perspective,
undoubtedly be the preliminary reference procedure. When national
constitutional courts embrace active cooperation with the ECJ by submitting
queries concerning the interpretation of rules of EU law in light of the Charter
or the compatibility of Union legislative measures with fundamental rights,
they provide the ECJ with additional opportunities to build its fundamental
rights case law.As the corpus of Charter decisions grows, there would bemore
clarity on the precise meaning and scope of protected rights, which should
make it progressively easier for litigants to obtain relief when their
fundamental rights and liberties as guaranteed under the Charter have been
impinged upon.
It is clear that, under both reasons, individuals alleging an infringement of
one of their Charter rights are cast as the ultimate beneficiaries. To be sure,
advancing the social and legal impact of a bill of rights with a view to
hopefully securing a better protection of individuals’ fundamental rights is by
all accounts a worthy objective that will resonate with many constitutional
courts.Yet, in and of itself, the prospect that they can further this goal will in
all probability not be sufficient to entice those courts to do what President
Skouris envisages and accept the Charter as a standard of review. This is
because there is another obvious beneficiary: the ECJ itself, whose
self-proclaimed position and authority as the Charter’s ultimate guardian
would profit from the increased resort to this instrument at the national level.
The gain for constitutional courts, however, is not immediately apparent and it
bears emphasizing that, just as with the ECJ, self-interest and preservation of
their status tend to feature prominently among the considerations that guide
their conduct.
If it is serious about encouraging emulation of the Verfassungsgerichtshof’s
approach, then the ECJ should seek to co-opt national constitutional courts in
90. Assuming that this provision could not also be successfully challenged for breaching
rights or liberties guaranteed under national constitutional law.
91. A similar sentiment was expressed by A.G. Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in his Opinion in
Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor deWereldVZW v. Leden van deMinisterraad, EU:C:2006:552,
paras. 28 and 81.
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upholding the Charter and making sure that the interaction between them and
the ECJ genuinely warrants the descriptive moniker of “cooperation” that
President Skouris brandished in his letter.92 This could for instance take the
form of the ECJ showing a greater willingness than it has done hitherto to
engage with national constitutional fundamental rights case law when
interpreting the Charter,93 and to do so explicitly, also in recognition of the
longer track record of constitutional courts in ensuring rights protection. As
their contribution to shaping the meaning of Charter rights becomes
established, constitutional courts may develop a real sense of shared
responsibility for, and co-ownership of, the development of EU fundamental
rights case law, including by means of enforcing the Charter in constitutional
litigation. Additionally, some measure of deference could be practised when
regular courts inquire about the compatibility of national legislation with the
Charter if the competent constitutional court has already concluded after a
thorough review that no conflict exists.
Assuming that more constitutional courts decide to apply the Charter in
constitutional litigation – for any of the reasons mentioned or prompted by
other considerations – there are further issues to think about. Most poignantly,
will they embrace the Charter in its entirety as providing standards for review?
The Verfassungsgerichtshof declined to do so, opting to recognize those
Charter guarantees that are “similar in [their] wording and purpose” to
constitutionally protected rights.94 The attraction of such an approach is that it
preserves the centrality of the national bill of rights as the main point of
reference, making it less susceptible to being eclipsed by the Charter which
litigants could otherwise prefer as the more modern and comprehensive rights
catalogue.95 It also avoids the constitutional court having to apply those
Charter provisions that contain principles and are not intended to be justiciable
without further operationalization. But there are also drawbacks. The
constitutional court will presumably decide on a case-by-case basis whether a
92. The question whether some classic doctrines of EU law need recalibrating to support a
constructive modus vivendi between the ECJ and national constitutional courts has also been
debated outside the specific context of Charter enforcement in constitutional adjudication, see
e.g. Cartabia, “Taking dialogue seriously –The renewed need for a judicial dialogue at the time
of constitutional activism in the European Union”, (2007) Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/07,
at 41; Sarmiento, “Reinforcing the (domestic) constitutional protection of primacy of EU law”,
50 CML Rev. (2013), 875–891, at 890–891; Bobek, “The impact of the European mandate of
ordinary courts on the position of constitutional courts” in Claes et al., op. cit. supra note 38, pp.
307–308.
93. Cf.Art. 52(4) of the Charter, andCase 4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung
v. Commission, EU:C:1974:51, para 13.
94. Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 14 March 2012 cited supra note 13, para 35.
95. E.g. theAustrian Constitution does not recognizemost of the social rights guaranteed by
the Charter in Title IV.
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particular Charter right is available as a constitutional assessment criterion,96
creating additional work for the court and a phase of uncertainty for
petitioners as to whether they can invoke the Charter when challenging
domestic legal norms. It is readily apparent that deciding on this, and other
issues pertaining to the constitutional enforcement of the Charter, requires a
good dose of judicial acumen to ensure that the choices made work well in
Europe’s multilevel fundamental rights system.
Maartje de Visser*
96. This approach is explicitly accepted by the Verfassungsgerichtshof in its Charter
decision of 14 March 2012, cited supra note 13, para 36.
* School of Law, Singapore Management University.
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